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1. Introduction  
Attempts to explain movements in a country’s current account have been a major 
focus of theoretical open-economy macroeconomics. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
discuss, the two dominant strains of this literature are the intertemporal approach and the 
overlapping generations model. The intertemporal approach uses an infinite horizon 
model to predict that a country experiencing a transitory, positive output shock will move 
towards a current account surplus while a country experiencing a transitory, negative 
shock will move towards a current account deficit. The current account is therefore a 
mechanism for intertemporal consumption smoothing. Overlapping generations models 
provide a different explanation. Here, the current account equals net public saving plus 
net private saving. If a country has a relatively young population, then a large fraction of 
its population will save for retirement and the current account will move towards a 
surplus. A country with an older population will draw on its savings and the current 
account will move towards a deficit.1 
 This paper uses a model similar to the intertemporal approach but suppresses all 
previous sources of current account dynamics. Our assumption that agents form 
expectations through adaptive learning instead of rational expectations alone drives the 
model’s dynamics. The basis of our model is a Ricardian framework in which exogenous 
technological differences leads to complete specialization. Output depends on a serially 
correlated, observable technology shock that governs the translation between labor (the 
only input) and output. Each country chooses its level of consumption of both goods and 
                                                
1 This explanation has used by Fed chairman Benjamin Ber anke (2005) when explaining the U.S.’s large 
current account deficit.  
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its level of debt. In the model’s rational expectations equilibrium (REE), international 
debt follows a random walk without drift. When we replace rational expectations with 
adaptive learning, however, the dynamics of internatio l debt fundamentally change. 
Depending on the model’s exact specification and agents’ specific learning algorithms, 
debt will behave like either a stationary or an explosive process. If debt behaves like an 
explosive process, then a financial crisis will eventually occur to ensure that debt does 
not violate the model’s transversality condition.  
Under rational expectations, the model does not produce a unique steady state; 
rather, a continuum of steady states exists where any level of international debt 
corresponds to a different steady state. We lineariz  the model around its debt-free steady 
state, and find that in equilibrium both countries will attempt to keep their level of debt 
constant. As a result, the current account will depend only on a white noise error term. 
Under adaptive learning, debt is either stationary or follows an explosive process. Using 
both a baseline and a simplified version of recursive least squares learning, we identify 
cases where debt follows an explosive process.  
Under adaptive learning, the AR(1) coefficient on debt is a function of the 
model’s learning parameters. When the learning parameters equal their rational 
expectations values, the AR(1) coefficient equals one and debt follows a random walk. 
Adaptive learning, however, keeps the economy away from its REE and the AR(1) 
coefficient need not equal one. When the AR(1) coeffici nt on debt is a concave function, 
debt follows a stationary process. On the other hand, when it is a convex, debt is 
explosive. Different approaches to modeling learning yield different functions, some 
concave and some convex. Thus, under many reasonable types of learning, a free or pre-
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determined variable that follows a random walk under rational expectations will not 
follow a random walk under adaptive learning. Therefor , along with providing a new 
explanation for current account movements and currency crises, our results demonstrate 
that introducing learning into a model that has a unit root under rational expectations may 
fundamentally change the model’s dynamics. 
Relatively few papers have analyzed the effects of learning on the dynamics of an 
open economy. Arifovic (1996) examines a two-country model with a continuum of 
steady state exchange rates. When a genetic learning algorithm replaces the assumption 
of rational expectations, the exchange rate appears to follow a random walk. This result 
differs from our model where adaptive learning eliminates the model’s unit root. Kasa 
(2004) introduces learning into the Obstfeld (1997) “escape clause” model. Learning 
causes the exchange rate to follow a Markov process that helps explain recurring 
currency crises.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3 
solves the model under rational expectations. Section 4 replaces the assumption of 
rational expectations with the assumption that agents l arn adaptively using recursive 
least squares. There, we find that unlike under ration l expectations, debt follows an 
explosive process. Section 5 generalizes this result further by showing that in any model 
with a unit root under rational expectations, learning can cause that process to be either 
stationary or explosive. Section 6 discusses how explosive debt leads to currency crises 
and examines how the rate of learning affects the tim until a crisis. Section 7 discusses 




2. A Simple General Equilibrium Model of International Trade 
Our general equilibrium model builds off of the well-known Ricardian model of 
trade where relative technological differences across countries drive comparative 
advantages.2  We consider two countries: Home and Foreign.3 Each country can convert 
its exogenous stock of labor into two consumption gods, X and Y. We normalize the 
stock of labor in each country to one.  
As is standard, production always exhibits constant returns to scale, but we 
assume that all unit labor requirements follow exogenous, stationary processes over time. 
Home’s unit labor requirements for goods X and Y in period t are 
1
ts
−  and 1ta
−  
respectively. Both of these unit labor requirements evolve according to AR(1) processes:  
 1t t ts s
ρ ε−=  and  (2.1) 
 
1tt c t
a a aρ ε
−
=  
where ln( )tε  is mean-zero white noise and (0,1)ρ ∈ .  
Similarly, Foreign’s unit labor requirements for goods Y and X in period t are * 1ts
−  
and * 1ta
−  respectively. These also evolve according to AR(1) processes: 
 * * *1t t ts s
ρε−=  and  
 
1
* * * *
t tt c
a a a ρε
−
=   
where *ln( )tε  is also mean-zero white noise.  
                                                
2 See Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (1998) for a presentation of the classic Ricardian model. 
3 An asterisk (*) denotes Foreign variables. 
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The two error terms, tε  and 
*
tε , represent observable, country-specific, industry-
neutral technology shocks. We assume that ca  and 
*
ca  lie between zero and one, which 








< .  
            This assumption implies that Home has a comparative advantage in the production 
of X. As is standard in the Ricardian model, with trade Home will completely specialize 
in the production of X, while Foreign will completely specialize in the production of Y. 
Therefore, in the trade equilibrium st denotes Home (and world) production of X, and 
*
ts  
denotes Foreign (and world) production of Y. We assume that the autoregressive 
parameter, (0,1)ρ ∈ , is identical for both countries.  
Consumers in both countries derive utility from theconsumption of both goods. 
Per-period utility in each country is given by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, where 
(0,1)α ∈ : 
 1ln( )t t t tu X Y
α αξ−=  and  
 * * *1 *ln( )t t t tu X Y
α αξ−= .  
The variables tX and tY  denote Home’s consumption of goods X and Y.
4 The 
variables ln( )tξ  and 
*ln( )tξ  are exogenous, white noise preference shocks that affec each 
country’s marginal utility. Incorporating these preference shocks into the model has two 
small but useful effects. First, under rational expectations, it causes international debt to 
                                                
4 In equilibrium, Home’s consumption of good X, Xt, will be less than its production of good X, st. 
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follow a random walk rather than being constant. Second, under adaptive learning, it 
ensures that the learning process is persistent.  
 Home and Foreign trade where Pt represents the relative price of Y in terms of X. 
The Cobb-Douglas form of the utility functions requires that both countries consume 
positive amounts of both goods each period, otherwise utility will approach negative 
infinity. Therefore in equilibrium, both countries will always choose to trade with each 
other. In addition, one country may borrow from theother at the interest rate, 1tr + . The 
variable Nt represents Foreign’s debt to Home, expressed in terms of good X. Because 
the model does not include capital, the only way that one country can save is to make 
loans to the other country. Debt evolves according to the following equation: 
 1 1 1 1 1(1 )t t t t t t tN r N s X P Y− − − − −= + + − − . (2.2) 
World consumption of good X must equal Home’s production of good X, and 
world consumption of good Y must equal Foreign’s production of good Y: 
 *t t tX X s+ =  and (2.3) 
 * *t t tY Y s+ = . (2.4) 
 Both countries discount utility at the rate β. Home’s intertemporal utility 
maximization problem entails choosing Xt and Yt to maximize: 
 1,
0
max { [ln( )]}
t t
t i
X Y t t i t i t i
i





∑ .  
 Home’s maximization problem is subject to Equations (2.1) and (2.2), and a No-
Ponzi Games condition: 
 [lim ] 0t it t i
i
E Nβ + +→∞ ≤ .  
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The Cobb-Douglas form of each utility function ensures that both countries will 
spend constant shares of their total expenditures on each good. It is therefore possible to 
eliminate both Xt and Yt from Home’s maximization problem, and instead rely on the 
value of Home’s consumption: t t t tM X PY= + . Home’s maximization problem yields an 
Euler Equation and a transversality condition: 
 1 1 1 11 1 1(1 ) [( ]t t t t t tM r E Mξ β ξ
− − − −
+ + += +  and (2.5) 
 [lim ] 0t it t i
i
E Nβ + +→∞ = . (2.6) 
We assume that the rate of return on debt between priods t and t+1 is specified at the 
time of debt’s purchase. We therefore treat this rate of return, 1tr + , as known. Foreign’s 
intertemporal utility maximization problem mimics that of Home and yields an additional 
Euler Equation. Defining the value of Foreign’s consumption as * * *t t t tM X PY= + : 
 * 1 * 1 * * 1 * 11 1 1(1 ) [ ]t t t t t tM r E Mξ β ξ
− − − −
+ + += + . (2.7) 
Equations (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) may also be re-stated in terms of tM  and 
*
tM : 
 1 1 1(1 )t t t t tN r N s M− − −= + + −  and (2.8) 
 *( )t t tM M sα + = . (2.9) 
Equations (2.1), (2.5), (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) fully characterize the system. By 
relying on the value of Home’s and Foreign’s consumption, we eliminate *ts  and Pt from 
the system. We can now consider the model’s “temporary” equilibrium for any pair of 
expectations, 1[ ]t tE M +  and 
* *
1[ ]t tE M + . Agents use their Euler Equations, (2.5) and (2.7), 
to determine their current level of consumption. The interest rate, 1tr + , endogenously 
adjusts to ensure that the global resource constrait, Equation (2.9), is satisfied. The debt 
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accumulation equation (2.8) then determines the next p riod’s level of debt. Section 3 
discusses the model where agents form expectations usi g rational expectations. Sections 
4 through 7 discuss the model where agents form expectations using adaptive learning. 
 
3. Solving the Model Under Rational Expectations 
 We define the system’s steady state as [ , *, , , ]z M M N s r= . Using Equation (2.1)
and the assumption that ln( )tε  is mean-zero white noise, Home’s steady state production 
of good X, ,s  equals one. Both Euler Equations, (2.5) and (2.7), simplify to the same 
expression when evaluated at their steady state: 
 1 1r β −= − . (3.1) 
 Two equations, (2.8) and (2.9), remain to identify three steady state values: ,M  
* ,M  and .N  The model therefore does not produce a unique steady st te. Instead, a 
continuum of steady states exists where any value of N c rresponds to the following 
steady state values of ,M  and * :M     
 1( 1) 1M Nβ −= − +  and  
 * 1( 1) (1 ) /M Nβ α α−= − − + − .   
At any steady state, * 1ξ ξ= = , and both countries perfectly smooth their 
consumption. The model’s two Euler Equations show that, without preference shocks, 
perfect consumption smoothing occurs if and only if the interest rate equals its steady 
state value. Because the steady value of the interest rate does not depend on the steady 
state values of either debt or consumption, however, any level of debt is consistent with 
perfect consumption smoothing and a continuum of steady states exists. At any steady 
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state level of debt, both countries are content to perpetually make (or receive) interest 
payments on their debt (or outstanding loans). For the remainder of the paper, we will 
rely on the steady state where debt equals zero: 
1[1, (1 ) / ,0,1, 1]oz α α β
−= − − .5   
To analyze the model’s dynamics under rational expectations, we approximate the 
system using a first order Taylor Series expansion ar und the debt-free steady state, 0z . 
Defining 0t tz z z= −ɶ , the linearized system becomes:
6 
 1t t ts sρ ε−= + ɶɶ ɶ , (3.2) 
 1 1[ ]t t t t tM E M rβ ξ+ += − − ɶɶ ɶ ɶ , (3.3) 
 * * * *1 1[ ] (1 ) /t t t t tM E M rα β α ξ+ += − − − ɶɶ ɶ ɶ , (3.4) 
 11 1 1t t t tN M N sβ
−
− − −= − + +ɶ ɶ  and (3.5) 
 *( )t t tM M sα + =ɶ ɶ ɶ . (3.6) 
 The use of linearizations to approximate non-linear models is common in 
dynamic macroeconomics. In this case, it introduces two sources of error into the 
analysis. The first source of error is the approximat on error associated with linearizing a 
non-linear model around any steady state. This type of error is present in any 
macroeconomic analysis that uses a linear approximation nd increases as the model 
moves further away from the steady state.7 The presence of a continuum of steady states 
in this model, however, introduces a second source of approximation error. The decision-
                                                
5 Appendix 2 re-linearizes the model each period around the steady state corresponding to the current level
of debt. The major conclusions of this paper do not change. 
6 It is not possible to log-linearize the system because debt’s steady state value is zero. The steady st tes of 
productivity and Home’s consumption equal one, therefore their linearized and log-linearized values are 
identical. 
7 Dotsey and Mao (1992) attempt to quantify this firt type of approximation error in models with a unique 
steady state. They conclude that approximation errors are generally small for sufficiently small deviations 
from the model’s steady state. 
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making rules of Equations (3.2) through (3.6) apply only to the debt-free steady state and 
are valid approximations only if the economy is sufficiently close to this steady state. 
International Real Business Cycle models (IRBC) also frequently produce a continuum of 
steady states. Letendre (2002) attempts to quantify the second source of approximation 
error caused by using a linear approximation of an IRBC model. He concludes that the  
approximation errors are small as long as the model is sufficiently close to the steady 
state that it is linearized around.8 
Equation (3.6) shows that the value of Foreign’s consumption is a linear 
combination of tsɶ  and tMɶ . It is therefore easy to eliminate 
*
tMɶ  from the system. By 
combining Equations (3.3) and (3.4), we also eliminate the interest rate from the system. 
Defining the white noise error term: * (1 )t t tω αξ α ξ= − −ɶ ɶ , the system now consists of 
Equations (3.2), (3.5), and:  
 *1 1(1 ) [ ] [ ] (1 )t t t t t t tM E M E M sα α ρ ω+ += − + + − +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ . (3.7) 
 Equations (3.2) and (3.5) define the evolution of the pre-determined variables tsɶ  
and tN . Equation (3.7) combines Home and Foreign’s Euler Equations, relating current 
consumption to expected future consumption. Equation (3.7) allows Home and Foreign to 
have different expectations of future consumption. U der rational expectations, however, 
both countries necessarily form identical expectations and it is possible to re-state 
Equation (3.7) as: 
 1[ ] (1 )t t t t tM E M sρ ω+= + − +ɶ ɶ ɶ . (3.8) 
                                                
8 There are two potential approaches to eliminating the second source of approximation error. The first is to 
directly simulate the non-linear model. This approach would eliminate both sources of approximation error. 
The second approach is to re-calculate agents’ decision making rules each period around the steady state
corresponding to that period’s level of debt. We pursue the latter approach in Appendix 2 and demonstrate 
that this paper’s major conclusions do not change.  
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or using vector notation: 
 1t t tz Gz ζ−= +ɶ ɶ . (3.9) 
 The term 1[ ]t t t tE M Mµ −= −ɶ ɶɶ  represents an extraneous expectational error that 
may affect the system. The three eigenvalues of the matrix G are 1, 1β − , and ρ . Because 
1 1β − > , Equation (3.9) represents an explosive system. The model’s transversality 
condition, Equation (2.6), may therefore be violated and it is necessary to suppress the 
explosive root, 
1β − , in order to derive a non-explosive solution. This requires factoring 
the G matrix so that: 
 1G S S −= Λ .  
The matrix S consists of J’s eigenvectors, and Λ consists only of the 
corresponding eigenvalues along the diagonal. By defining 1t tk S z
−=ɶ ɶ , it is possible to re-
write Equation (3.9) as: 
 11t t tk k S ζ
−
−= Λ +ɶ ɶ .  
To suppress the explosive root, we set the row of tk
ɶ  that corresponds to 1β −  equal 
to zero. This entails setting a linear combination of the variables in the system equal to 
zero. This side constraint details how agents choose the free variable, tMɶ , and eliminates 
the extraneous expectational error, tµɶ from the system. The model therefore possesses a 
unique solution. The relevant side constraint is: 
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 1( 1)t t t tM N sβ βω
−= − + +ɶ ɶ  (3.10) 
 Substituting Equation (3.10) into Equation (3.5) reveals that the necessary 
condition for the REE to be non-explosive is 1 1t t tN N βω− −= − . Defining the current 
account as 1t tN N −− , the current account simply equals white noise and there are no 
current account dynamics in the REE.9 Imposing Equation (3.10) yields the REE’s 
VAR(1) reduced form: 
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Equation (3.11) possesses a unit root and is therefor  not a stationary process. 
Suppose that Home experiences a positive productivity shock where tεɶ > 0. For 
simplicity, assume that 0tω = . The intertemporal approach to the current account 
predicts that Home will attempt to smooth the effects of this shock over time by lending 
to Foreign.10 The current account, 1t tN N −− , will therefore rise above zero. In our model 
with rational expectations, however, the current account will equal zero because of our 
choice of utility functions. We have normalized theprice of good X to one. Home’s 
income is therefore ts . Foreign’s income is the price of good Y multiplied by 
*
ts . The 
price of good Y depends on the ratio of both goods’ unit labor requirements and the 
relative weighting of each good in the utility functions: 
 *(1 ) /( )t t tP s sα α= − .  
                                                
9 The current account equals white noise because we linearize the model around the debt free steady state. 
In Appendix 2, we re-linearize the model each period around the steady state corresponding to the currnt 
level of debt. While debt continues to follow a random walk, in this case it depends on both white noise 
preference shocks and autocorrelated productivity shocks 
10 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
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 A positive productivity shock has two effects. First, for any tP , it raises Home’s 
wealth and therefore its utility. Second, by making good Y scarcer relative to good X, it 
increases tP  which benefits Foreign but harms Home. With our specification, this latter 
terms of trade effect is large enough so that Foreign’s income experiences the same 
proportional increase as Home’s.11 One country’s saving, however, necessarily equals the 
other’s borrowing. The equilibrium interest rate must therefore adjust to the productivity 
shock to ensure that global saving equals zero. Because both countries have identical 
incentives to save, however, this can only occur when tN  equals zero. If the model 
includes preference shocks, then the current account will equal white noise. In the next 
section, we replace the assumption of rational expectations with adaptive learning. The 
lack of current account dynamics in the REE allows us to isolate the effects of adaptive 
learning on the current account. 
 
4. E-Stability  
So far, we have assumed that both countries form rational expectations. Rational 
expectations assume that agents know the coefficients n the model’s side constraint that 
sets consumption equal to a linear combination of debt, productivity, and preference 
shocks:   
 1( 1)t t t tM N sβ βω
−= − + +ɶ ɶ . (4.1) 
An infinite number of models could generate this model’s reduced form. Rational 
expectations is a realistic assumption if both countries agree that this model best explains 
                                                
11 This is weaker version of the immiserizing growth effect where the impact of Home’s productivity shock 
on the terms of trade is so large that Home’s utility decreases. In our model, however, both countries 
benefit from Home’s productivity shock. For details on immiserizing growth, see Johnson (1954) and 
Bhagwati (1969). 
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the economy, know the calibrated parameter values, and are able to solve for Equation 
(4.1). However, if both countries do not know which model generates this reduced form, 
then rational expectations is not a realistic assumption. 
 We therefore now examine the model when agents use adaptive learning instead 
of rational expectations.12 A primary goal of this section is to provide unfamiliar readers 
with an introduction to adaptive learning using thecontext of our model. There are many 
sensible methods for modeling adaptive learning. However, because of the unit root in 
debt, the method chosen leads to very different predictions regarding the behavior of the 
current account. This section presents our baseline approach where debt behaves like an 
explosive process. Section 6 discusses the model unr coordinated learning, another, 
simpler approach under which debt behaves like an explosive process. Section 7 
discusses alternate methods of modeling learning where debt behaves like a stationary 
process.13  
In presenting our baseline case, we focus on the exp ctational or E-Stability of the 
model. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) demonstrate that under general conditions, a model 
is stable under adaptive learning if and only if its E-Stable. This approach to modeling 
adaptive learning assumes that agents know that consumption is a linear combination of 
the other variables in the system, but do not know the values of the coefficients in 
Equation (4.1). This yields agents’ perceived law of motion (PLM) for Home:14 
 t t tM aN bs= +ɶ ɶ . (4.2) 
                                                
12 For a thorough discussion of adaptive learning algorithms, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
13 Several additional types of learning are examined  Appendix 1. 
14 We assume that because agents’ data is measured as d vi tions from the zero debt steady state, agents are 
able to deduce that the side constraint’s intercept equals zero. They therefore employ a properly specified 
PLM. Including intercept terms in the model’s PLM does not affect whether the model is E-Stable or 
whether debt behaves explosively for any of the learning approaches discussed in the body of this paper. 
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Because agents do not know which structural model generates Equation (4.2), they are 
unaware that one of their regressors follows a random walk under rational expectations. 
Under rational expectations, we are able to eliminate *tM  from the model. Our 
baseline learning method, however, focuses on uncoordinated learning where Foreign 
uses data on its own consumption to forecast its own future consumption. Equation (3.7) 
includes Foreign’s expectation of Home’s consumption. By substituting the global 
resource constraint, Equation (3.6), into this equation we re-write the model’s forward-
looking structural equation to include Foreign’s exp ctation of its own consumption: 
 * *1 1(1 ) [ ] [ ]t t t t t t tM E M E M sα α ω+ += − − + +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ . (4.3) 
Using the global resource constraint, Equation (3.6), it is also possible to re-state 
the model’s side constraint in terms of Foreign’s consumption:  
 * 1 1(1 ) ( 1)t t t tM N sβ α βω
− −= − + − −ɶ ɶ . (4.4) 
We assume that Foreign’s agents base their PLM on Equation (4.4): 
 *t t tM cN ds= +ɶ ɶ ɶ . (4.5) 
 We assume that agents know the coefficients in Equations (3.2) and (3.5), which 
detail the evolution of the pre-determined variables. Home agents use their PLM, 
Equation (4.2), to form their expectations of future consumption:15 
 1 1 1[ ] [ ] [ ]t t t t t tE M aE N bE s+ + += +ɶ ɶ ,  
 1[ ]t t tE s sρ+ =ɶ ɶ  and  
 11[ ] [ ]t t t t t tE N E M N sβ
−
+ = − + +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ . 
                                                
15 The expectations operator on contemporaneous consumption reflects the possibility that agents may not 
know Mt when choosing their level of consumption. 
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It is reasonable to assume either that Home agents know the current value of tMɶ  when 
forming expectations at time t, or that they only know the value of 1tM −ɶ . Using the 
former assumption, Home agents’ expectation of future consumption equals:16 
 11[ ] ( )t t t t t tE M a M N s b sβ ρ
−
+ = − + + +ɶ ɶ ɶ . (4.6) 
Foreign agent’s expectation of their future consumption equals: 
 * * 11[ ] ( )t t t t t tE M c M N s d sβ ρ
−
+ = − + + +ɶ ɶ ɶ . (4.7) 
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) are not rational expectations. Instead they represent 
agents’ best estimate of future consumption given th ir informational deficiencies. 
Inserting these expectations into Equation (4.3), a forward-looking structural equation, 
yields the economy’s actual law of motion (ALM) for  tMɶ : 
 
1 1[1 (1 ) ] [(1 ) ]
[(1 )( ) ( ) 1]
t t
t t
a c M a c N
a b c d s
α α α β α β
α ρ α ρ ω
− −+ − − = − −




Substituting the economy’s global resource constraint, Equation (3.6), into 




(1 (1 ) ) [ (1 ) ]
[(1 (1 ) ) 1 (1 )( ) ( )]
t t
t t
a c M c a N
a c a b c d s
α α α β α β
α α α α ρ α ρ ω
− −
−
+ − − = − −




To evaluate E-Stability, we analyze the E-Stability differential equation based on 
the mapping from the models’ PLM to its ALM: 
 / ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )d d a b c d T a b c d a b c dτ = − . (4.10) 
The notation ( , , , )T a b c d refers to the vector of coefficients from the ALM, Equations 
(4.8) and (4.9), corresponding to ( , , , )a b c d  from the PLM, Equations (4.2) and (4.5). The 
                                                
16 Appendix 1 discusses the model using the latter assumption that agents do not know the current value of 
tMɶ . Under both assumptions, debt behaves like an explosive process. 
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eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix from Equation (4.10) equal –1, -1, 1β − , and 1βρ −  
when evaluated at the model’s REE. Because all of these eigenvalues have real parts less 
than one, the PLM converges to the ALM and the model is locally E-Stable.  
E-Stability implies that, for this type of PLM, the model is stable under learning 
for most sensible learning algorithms.17 We now consider one such learning algorithm: 
recursive least squares. Under recursive least squares, Home agents run an OLS 
regression of Mɶ on N  and sɶ  to obtain their initial learning parameter estimates, 0a  and 
0b . Foreign agents regress 
*Mɶ on N  and sɶ  to obtain their initial learning parameter 
estimates,0c  and 0d . They then update their estimates each period as new data becomes 
available using the following algorithm:  
 1 11 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( )t t tt t t t t t t
t t t
a a N
R M a N b s
b b s
γ− −− − − − − −
− −
     
= + − −     














γ − − −− −
− − −
 





 1 1* * * 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( )t t tt t t t t t t
t t t
c c N
R M c N d s
d d s
γ− − + − − − −
− −
     
= + − −     
     
ɶ ɶ
ɶ
 and  
 
2
* * * *1 1 1
1 12
1 1 1





γ − − −− −
− − −
 





 The gains, tγ  and 
*
tγ , represents the weights placed on the most recent 
observation. We consider two variations of the learning process. Under decreasing-gain 
learning, agents typically weigh all observations equally in their estimations, and the gain 
therefore equals the inverse of the sample size. As t approaches infinity, the gain 
                                                
17 For exact conditions for when E-Stability implies stability under adaptive learning, see Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001). 
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approaches zero and the learning process converges if th  model is stable under adaptive 
learning. Asymptotically the model will behave identically under rational expectations 
and adaptive learning, implying that asymptotically the current account is a random walk. 
 For the remainder of the paper, however, we will assume that agents use a 
constant-gain learning algorithm whereγ  is a constant. Constant-gain learning places 
greater emphasis on more recent observations than earlier observations. If the model 
includes preference shocks, as we have so far assumed, then the learning process will be 
persistent under constant-gain learning. This baseline approach is locally stable under 
learning. When simulated, the model’s learning parameters, ( , , , )t t t ta b c d , remain close to 
their rational expectations values.18 Switching from rational expectations to adaptive 
learning, however, fundamentally changes the dynamics of international debt. Numerical 
simulations demonstrate that debt now behaves like an xplosive process rather than a 
random walk.19 
 
5. Adaptive Learning with a Unit Root in a General Model 
 In our model, a unit root causes debt to follow a random walk under rational 
expectations. This section uses a more general model to illustrate how adaptive learning 
profoundly changes the dynamics of a system so that a unit root under rational 
expectations can behave like either a stationary or explosive process under adaptive 
learning.  
                                                
18 This approach is not, however, globally stable under learning. Sufficiently large shocks can move the 
model into a region where it is not stable under adaptive learning.  
19 Simulations of this case are available upon request. 
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 Consider a model with a persistent learning process where a free or pre-
determined variable, ty , possesses a unit root under rational expectations:
20 
 1t t ty y e−= +   
where 2(0, )te N σ∼ . 
 Under adaptive learning, the autoregressive process now depends on a vector of 
learning coefficients, denotedtχ . Defining REχ  as the vector of rational expectations 
counterparts to these learning parameters, the autoregressive process may be re-written 
as: 
 1( )t t t ty g y eχ −= +  
where ( ) 1REg χ = . 
 Adaptive learning keeps the economy out of its rational expectations equilibrium. 
The function ( )tg χ  will therefore typically not equal one. Two potential cases are of 
interest. First, the cumulative product of ( )tg χ  may asymptotically approach zero: 
 
0






→∏   
In this case, adaptive learning causes the free or pre-determined variable to behave like a 
stationary process around zero.  










→ ∞∏   
                                                
20 The results of this section do not apply to a unitroot on a purely exogenous variable. 
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In this case, adaptive learning causes the free or pre-determined variable to behave like 
an explosive process. As a result, it is possible that the model’s transversality condition 
will be violated. Whether the free variable acts like a stationary or an explosive process 
depends not only on the specific problem being studied, but also on the exact type of 
learning algorithm that agents use and agents’ information sets.21  
Very little research has focused on adaptive learning in the presence of a unit root 
on either a free or pre-determined variable. Other research does show, however, that 
adaptive learning can fundamentally change the dynamics of a system in a different 
context. Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2001) set up an overlapping generations 
model where the government finances its deficit by issuing money. If the deficit is 
constrained as a share of GDP, then the model oftenpossesses four steady states. Under 
perfect foresight, it is possible to converge to twof these steady states, including an 
autarky solution where money is worthless and a hyperinflation occurs. Under adaptive 
learning, however, the economy always converges to an interior solution and a 
hyperinflation can never occur.  
Sections 6 and 7 apply the results of this section to our model of international debt 
by examining two different types of learning where debt behaves like an explosive and 




                                                
21 This section assumes that the learning process is persistent. If a model includes sufficient uncertainty, 
then constant-gain learning will typically be a persistent process. Decreasing-gain learning, however, is 
typically not a persistent process. If the learning process is not persistent, then model will approach a 
random walk as the learning process converges. 
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6. Explosive Debt  
 In our baseline learning approach of Section 4, the model is stable under adaptive 
learning but debt behaves like an explosive process. For sufficiently small preference 
shocks, the model’s learning parameters remain in the neighborhood of their rational 
expectations values, but the absolute value of debt increases over time. Because 
analytical results are unclear in our baseline approach, we make one additional 
modification in this section by modeling coordinated learning instead of uncoordinated 
learning.22 Under coordinated learning, both countries use Home’s consumption data to 
form their expectations. Foreign’s PLM therefore becomes: 
 t t tM cN ds= +ɶ ɶ . (6.1) 
 Foreign agents use Equation (6.1) to form their expectation of Home’s future 
consumption. They then use the global resource constrai t, Equation (3.6), to convert this 
expectation into an expectation of Foreign’s future consumption: 
 * * *1 1 1[ ] [ ] [ ]t t t t t tE M cE N dE s+ + += +ɶ ɶ  and 
 * * * *1 1 1[ ] [ ] [ ] /t t t t t tE M E M E s α+ + += − +ɶ ɶ ɶ . (6.2) 
 By inserting the expectation from Equation (6.2) into Equation (4.3), we are able 
to obtain the economy’s ALM: 
 
1(1 (1 ) ) [((1 ) ) ]
[(1 )( ) ( ) 1 ]
t t
t t
a c M a c N
a b c d s
α α α α β
α ρ α ρ ρ ω
−+ − + = − +




The Jacobian of / ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )d d a b c d T a b c d a b c dτ = −  has eigenvalues equal to 
                                                
22 Coordinated learning has two additional technical advantages over uncoordinated learning. First, while 
both methods are locally stable under learning, random shocks are less likely to move the coordinated 
learning algorithm into a region where it is unstable under learning. Second, it is computationally easi r to 
repeatedly simulate coordinated learning than uncoordinated learning. 
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 –1, -1, 1β − , and 1βρ −  when evaluated at the model’s REE. Because all of these 
eigenvalues have real parts less than zero, this type of coordinated learning is locally E-
Stable.  
By substituting Equation (6.3) into Equation (3.5), we re-write the debt 





[1 (1 (1 ) ) ((1 ) )]
[1 (1 (1 ) ) ((1 )( ) ( ) 1 )]
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
N a c a c N
a c a b c d s
β α α α α




= − + − + − +
+ − + − + − + + + + − − ɶɶ
. (6.4) 
 If the learning parameters equal their rational expectations values, 
1[ , ] [ , ] [ 1,1]a b c d β −= = − , then Equation (6.4) reduces to Equation (3.10) and debt 
follows a random walk. To understand the intuition f r why debt behaves explosively, 
suppose that the learning parameters are distributed symmetrically around their rational 
expectations values.24 In the case of homogeneous learning where [ , ] [ , ]t t t ta b c d= , 
Equation (6.4) may be re-stated: 
 1 1 11 [1 (1 ) ] [1 (1 ) ( 1 )]t t t t t t t t tN a a N a a b sβ ρ ρ ω
− − −
+ = − + + − + + + − − ɶɶ .  
Because 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( (1 (1 ) )) / 2 (1 ) (1 (1 ) ) 0t t t t t td a a da a a aβ β
− − − − −− + = + − + >  for all 
ta , 
1(1 (1 ) )t ta a
−− + is a convex function. By Jensen’s Inequality: 
 1 1 1 1[ (1 (1 ) )] [ (1 [ ](1 [ ]) )] 1t t t tE a a E a E aβ β
− − − −− + > − + = .  
It is therefore the case that: 
 1
1







− + → ∞∏   
                                                
23 Equation (6.4) defines 1(1 (1 ) )t t t ta cω α α ω
−= + − +ɶ . 
24 Evans and Honkapohja (2001) formally prove this result in the case of standard, constant-gain learning. 
Their proof does not extend, however, to include cases where the model includes a unit root. Our numerical 
simulations confirm, however, that the distributions of the learning parameters are sufficiently symmetric 
around their rational expectations values. 
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and debt will behave like an explosive process. Numerical simulations confirm the 
explosiveness of debt in this case and that it extends to cases with heterogeneous and/or 
uncoordinated learning (as in Section 4).25    
We now simulate the homogeneous case. We set 0N =.00, 
* 0.01γ γ= = ,  
1
0 0 0 0[ , ] [ , ] [ 1,1]a b c d β
−= = − , and *0 0 2R R I= = .
26 We assume that tεɶ  is uniformly 
distributed between -.005 and .005 and that tωɶ  is uniformly distributed between -.0005 
and .0005.27 Debt now behaves like an explosive process, threatening to violate the 
model’s transversality conditions. We assume that once the absolute value of debt  
reaches a pre-determined level, a financial crisis occurs.28 For this simulation, we assume 
that a crisis occurs when | | .50tN > .
29 When a crisis occurs, the debtor country is required 
to pay the creditor country interest plus 5% of its debt every period. Once the debt is 
below half of the crisis level, the debtor country is again free to borrow and the model 
once again operates normally. Figure 1 charts the simulated paths of Foreign’s debt to 
Home and Foreign’s consumption over a period where Fo ign’s debt happens to trigger 
                                                
25 We also directly simulate the non-linear model of Section 2 where agents continue to use linear PLMs. 
Once again, depending on the exact type of learning, both explosive and stationary cases exist. Simulation 
results for both the linear and non-linear models are available on request. 
26 I2 is the 2x2 identity matrix. 
27 For these simulations, we treat the rational expectations value of 1(1 (1 ) )t ta cα α
−+ − +  as known; 
therefore, t tω βω=ɶ . 
28 Evans and Honkapohja (2005) employ a similar strategy in an unrelated model. Their paper examines a 
New Keynesian model where the central bank is passive in responding to inflationary pressures and where 
the government does not actively attempt to balance its intertemporal budget constraint. In that model, 
government debt behaves explosively for all equilibrium paths. The authors assume that if government dbt 
exceeds a pre-determined level, then the government pursues an alternate fiscal policy that ensures that its 
debt behaves like a stationary process. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) assume that the government switches its 
policy from using the money supply to finance seignorage to an exchange rate rule if and only if inflation 
exceeds a certain threshold. 
29 This cutoff is similar to the sudden stop/ “Wile E. Coyote” literature in open-economy macroeconomics. 
See Krugman (2006) for a discussion.  
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two crises.30 For anecdotal comparison, compare this to Figure 2, which plots the actual 
values of debt and consumption for Argentina during its recent financial crisis. As can be 
seen, the two look remarkably similar. 
The vast majority of research into adaptive learning assumes that all agents use 
the same learning algorithm. Under constant-gain learning, however, it is not obvious 
which gain agents should use.31 It is reasonable to assume that different agents may use 
different gains. In this section, we will therefore examine cases where both Home and 
Foreign use the same gain and where they use different gains. Only a few papers have 
studied adaptive learning where agents use different gai s in their constant-gain learning 
algorithms. Negroni (2003) divides the population into two groups, each of which uses a 
different gain. Heterogeneous gains make his model less likely to be stable under 
adaptive learning. Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) obtain similar results when agents use 
different learning algorithms.  
We further evaluate the model’s dynamics by repeating the previous simulation 
for several different pairs of gains. We simulate th  learning process 5,000 times for nine 
gain combinations where γ  and *γ  equal .01, .02, or .03. If a country’s gain equals .01, 
then that country is a slow learner. If a country’s gain equals .03, then that country is a 
fast learner. In all 45,000 simulations, debt behavs like an explosive process, threatening 
to violate the model’s transversality conditions.32 Table 1 summarizes the average time 
                                                
30 The time between crises is highly variable and does not always follow the pattern of Figure 1. For this 
simulation, the level of debt where the debtor country is able to borrow again, .25, is high enough to ensure 
that the debtor country rarely becomes the lender country. Lower values for this threshold increase the 
frequency of these switches. 
31 Evans and Ramey (2005) endogenize the gain in a simpler model with constant-gain learning. 
32 The model is only locally stable under adaptive learning. In some simulations, unobservable shocks drive 
the economy into a region where it is unstable under a aptive learning. These simulations are discarded. 
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until a crisis for all nine combinations of gains and yields the following three sets of 
hypotheses. 
 
Null Hypothesis 1: d(γ+τ, γ* )- d(γ, γ*) = 0 if γ  ≥ γ*, for τ  > 0.  
 
Null Hypothesis 1a: d(γ, γ*+τ )- d(γ, γ*) = 0 if γ*  ≥ γ, for τ  > 0. 
 
These hypotheses state that if the faster learner uses a larger gain (learns even faster), 
then the time until a crisis is unaffected. We fail to reject these null hypotheses for all 
applicable gain combinations.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis 2: d(γ+τ, γ* )- d(γ, γ*) = 0 if γ*  > γ, for τ  > 0.  
 
Null Hypothesis 2a: d(γ, γ*+τ )- d(γ, γ*) = 0 if γ  > γ*, for τ  > 0. 
 
These hypotheses state that if the slower learner uses a larger gain (learns faster), then 
the time until a crisis is unaffected. We reject these null hypotheses for all applicable 
gain combinations in favor of the alternative that increasing the gain of the slower 
learner decreases the time until a crisis. 
 
Null Hypothesis 3: d(γ, γ*) - d(γ+τ, γ*+τ) - d(γ, γ*) = 0 for, τ  > 0.  
This hypothesis states that if both countries become faster learners, then the time until a 
crisis is unaffected. Graphically, this implies moving down and to the right in Table 1. 
We reject this null hypothesis for all applicable gain combinations in favor of the 
alternative that the time until a crisis decreases. 
Null Hypothesis 4: d(γ, γ*) - d(γ*, γ) = 0.  
 
This hypothesis states that Table 1 must be a symmetric matrix. When α equals one-half, 
both 1[ ]t tE M +ɶ and 
*
1[ ]t tE M +ɶ enter Equation (3.7) in exactly the same manner. It therefore 
cannot matter whether Home or Foreign is the faster learner. We fail to reject this null 
hypothesis for all nine combinations of gains. 
 The first two sets of hypotheses yield two interesting conclusions. First, the gain 
of the slower learner has a larger effect on the tim  until a crisis occurs than the gain of 
the faster learner. Second, if both countries become faster learners, then the speed of 
divergence increases. If both gains equal zero, then adaptive learning and rational 
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expectations are identical in these simulations. Debt will display no tendency to diverge 
and the time until a crisis will be very long. In these simulations, the rational expectations 
values of the learning parameters are constant. Larger gains move the model further from 
its rational expectations equilibrium, strengthening the tendency to diverge, and 
shortening the time until a crisis.  
7. Stationary Debt 
 Sections 4 and 6 demonstrate that a particular set of assumptions may cause debt 
to behave like an explosive process instead of a random walk. This section discusses 
alternate assumptions that cause debt to behave like a stationary process. So far, we have 
assumed that agents attempt to learn the model’s side constraint, Equation (4.1), that sets 
consumption equal to a linear combination of debt, productivity, and preference shocks. 
It is also reasonable to assume that agents attempt to learn the model’s VAR(1) reduced 
form, Equation (3.11), that sets consumption equal to  linear combination of the model’s 
lagged variables and current shocks. If we also replac  recursive least squares with 
stochastic gradient learning, then debt behaves lik a stationary process regardless of 
whether or not agents know the current values of tMɶ and whether agents use coordinated 




 This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model that suppresses all 
previous explanations of current account dynamics. The effects of adaptive learning on 
                                                
33 For a discussion of stochastic gradient learning, see Evans, Honkapohja, and Williams (2005). 
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the current account are therefore isolated. Under rational expectations, debt follows a 
random walk. Adaptive learning, however, fundamentally alters the models dynamics so 
that debt behaves like either an explosive or station ry process. Whether debt tends to 
diverge or converge depends on agents’ specific learning algorithm.  
 This paper’s conclusions regarding learning may be applicable to other models. 
International Real Business Cycle models also tend o exhibit an endogenous unit root 
under rational expectations. Given the similarities b tween our model and an IRBC 
model, we would expect these results to carry over to that class of models. Furthermore, 
this paper’s general result may also extend to models that do not include a unit root. 
Consider a model that contains an explosive process under rational expectations due to an 
eigenvalue with an absolute value greater than one. If the absolute value of this 
eigenvalue is sufficiently close to one, then adaptive learning could cause the model to 
behave like a stationary process. Likewise, if a model is stationary under rational 
expectations, then adaptive learning could cause the model to behave like an explosive 
process if it contained an eigenvalue with an absolute value sufficiently close to one. 
 This paper’s purpose is not to argue that previous explanations of the current 
account are invalid. Rather, its goal is to examine the effect of a new factor, adaptive 
learning, in a simplified environment. It is possible that the effect of learning on the 
current account will differ if previous explanations are also included in the model. 
Learning’s role in a more complex model remains a rich area for further research. 
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Appendix 1: Different Types of Learning in the Model of International Debt 
 In our model, debt follows a random walk under rational expectations but behaves 
as either an explosive or stationary process under a aptive learning. This section 
discusses three assumptions that can affect debt’s dynamics and reports debt’s behavior 
for each permutation.  
Assumption 1: Not Knowing tMɶ vs. Knowing tMɶ  
 The learning algorithm of Section 4 assumes that at time t, agents know tMɶ  and 
*
tMɶ . If agents know 1tM −ɶ  and 
*
1tM −ɶ , but not tMɶ  and 
*
tMɶ  at time t, the results potentially 
may change. Under this assumption, Home and Foreign’s expectations of their future 
consumption equal: 
 11[ ] ( ) [ (1 ) ]t t t tE M a a N a b b sβ ρ
−
+ = − + − + ɶ  and 
 * * 1 11[ ] ( ) [ (1 ) ]t t t tE M c c N c d d sβ α ρ
− −
+ = + + − + +ɶ ɶ .  




[(1 ) ( ) ( )]
[(1 )( ) ( ) 1]
t t
t t
M a a c c N
a ab b c c cd d s
α β α β
α ρ α α ρ ω
− −
−
= − − − +
+ − − + − − + + + +
ɶ
ɶ




[ (1 ) ( ) ( )]
[ (1 )( ) ( ) 1 ]
t t
t t
M a a c c N
a ab b c c cd d s
α β α β
α ρ α α ρ α ω
− −
− −
= − − − + +




The results for this model, however, do not depend on whether or not agents know 
the current values of tMɶ  and 
*
tMɶ  for any of the types of learning that we consider. 
Assumption 2: Learning the Side Constraint vs. Learning the VAR(1) with Stochastic 
Gradient Learning 
 The discussion of adaptive learning in Section 4 assumes that agents attempt to 
learn the model’s side constraint by estimating current consumption as a function of 
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current debt and productivity. Alternatively, agents could attempt to learn the model’s 
VAR(1) reduced form, represented by Equation (3.11), by regressing current 
consumption on lagged consumption, lagged debt, and lagged productivity. Consider the 
simpler case of coordinated learning where the PLM for Home and Foreign equals 
 1 1 1t t t t tM aM bN cs ε− − −= + + +ɶ ɶ ɶɶ  and  
 11 1 1 ( 1)t t t t tM dM eN fs α ε
−
− − −= + + + −ɶ ɶ ɶɶ .  
Assuming that agents know the current values of tMɶ  and 
*
tMɶ , both countries use 
this PLM to form their expectations of future consumption: 
 1[ ]t t t t tE M aM bN cs+ = + +ɶ ɶ ɶ  and  
 * 1[ ]t t t t tE M dM eN fs+ = + +ɶ ɶ ɶ .  
Inserting these expectations into Equation (3.7) yields the economy’s ALM: 
 
[1 (1 ) ] [(1 ) ]
[(1 ) 1 ]
t t
t t
a d M b e N
c f s
α α α α
α α ρ ω
− − − = − +
+ − + + − +
ɶ
ɶ
 and  
 * /t t tM M s α= − +ɶ ɶ ɶ .  
To ensure that the model is stable under learning, we assume that agents use 
stochastic gradient learning instead of recursive least squares.34 Under stochastic gradient 




R R χ  = =  
 
  
where χ  is an arbitrary constant.  
                                                
34 For a discussion of stochastic gradient learning, see Evans, Honkapohja, and Williams (2005). 
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 Assuming that the learning parameters are symmetrically distributed around their 
rational expectations values, the debt accumulation equation may be re-stated in the case 
of heterogeneous learning where [ , , ] [ , , ]t t t t t ta b c d e f= : 
 1 1 1 11 [ (1 ) ] [1 (1 ) ( 1 )] (1 )t t t t t t t t tN a b N a c s aβ ρ ω
− − − −
+ = − − + − − + − − −ɶ .  
Because 2 1 1( (1 ) )t td b aβ
− −− −  is negative semidefinite when evaluated close to 
the learning parameters’ rational expectations value, 1 1( (1 ) )t tb aβ
− −− −  is a concave 
function. Because tω  and tsɶ  are exogenous processes and 
2 1 1( (1 ) )t td b aβ
− −− −  has one 
eigenvalue less than zero when evaluated close to the learning parameters’ rational 
expectations values: 
 1 1 1 1[( (1 ) )] [( [ ](1 [ ]) )] 1t t t tE b a E b E aβ β
− − − −− − < − − = .  
It is therefore the case that: 
1 1
1






− − →∏  
and debt will behave like a stationary process if the learning parameters are 
symmetrically distributed around their rational expctations values. 
 Numerical simulations confirm that this type of VAR(1) learning as while as 
heterogeneous and/or uncoordinated VAR(1) learning cause debt to behave like a 
stationary process.35 
                                                
35 These simulations also show, however, that under stochastic gradient learning the learning parameters 
typically are not symmetrically distributed around their rational expectations values. Instead, the learning 
parameters usually become “stuck” in an area that corresponds to an AR(1) coefficient on debt less than 
one. Asymmetric distributions, as well as concavity, may therefore induce stationary debt. 
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Assumption 3: Coordinated Learning vs. Uncoordinated Learning 
 Section 4 discusses uncoordinated learning where both countries’ PLMs depend 
on their own levels of consumption. Section 6 relies on coordinated learning where both 
countries’ PLMs depend on Home’s consumption data. This distinction does not affect 
whether debt behaves like an explosive or stationary process. 




SC/VAR CONT/PRI COR/UNCOR RESULT
SC CONT COR Explosive
SC CONT UNCOR Explosive
SC PRI COR Explosive
SC PRI UNCOR Explosive
VAR CONT COR Stationary
VAR CONT UNCOR Stationary
VAR PRI COR Stationary
VAR PRI UNCOR Stationary
Table 2
Behavior of Debt Under Different Types of Adaptive Learning 
Notes: SC and VAR refer to learning the side constrain  and learning the VAR(1) respectively. 
CONT and PRI refer to knowing and not knowing the current value of consumption. COR and 
UNCOR refer to coordinated and uncoordinated learning respectively. 
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Appendix 2: Non-Linearities 
 So far, we have approximated our model by using a first order Taylor Series 
expansion around the debt-free steady state. Becaus debt follows a random walk and the 
model possesses a continuum of steady states, it is no obvious that our linear 
approximation is valid. Under rational expectations, the model displays no tendency to 
converge towards the debt-free steady state. It is therefore equally valid to linearize our 
model around any other steady state. In this appendix, we iteratively re-linearize the 
model around the steady state corresponding to the level of debt in each period. The 
central conclusions of this paper are unaffected. Under rational expectations, debt 
continues to follow a random walk. Under adaptive learning, however, debt behaves like 
either an explosive or a stationary process. 
For any steady state level of debt, the model’s steady state equals:  
 1 1 1[ , *, , , ] [( 1) 1, ( 1) (1 ) / , ,1, 1]M M N s r N N Nβ β α α β− − −= − + − − + − − . 
We now take a first order Taylor Series expansion ar und the steady state for any 
level of debt. We continue to define tXɶ  as the deviation of X from its debt-free steady 
state rather than the steady state corresponding to N . This choice ensures that the units 
of measurement for tM and 
*
tM  do not change along with the steady state value of debt.
36 
To simplify the model, we limit preference shocks to Home’s Euler Equation. The 
model’s linearized Euler Equations become: 
 1 1[ ]t t t t tM E M Mrβ ξ+ += − − ɶɶ ɶ ɶ  and (8.1) 
 
                                                
36 For productivity and the interest rate, this distinc ion is trivial because their steady state values do not 
depend on N . 
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 * * * *1 1[ ]t t t tM E M M rβ+ += −ɶ ɶ ɶ . (8.2) 
 The model’s debt accumulation equation now includes a term allowing for the 
deviation of the interest rate from its steady state: 
 1 11 1( 1) ( )t t t t tN N M N N N s Nrβ β
− −
+ +− = − + − + − + +ɶ ɶ ɶ . (8.3) 
 The model’s global resource constraint and the AR(1) productivity shock are 
unchanged from the original linearization: 
 *( )t t tM M sα + =ɶ ɶ ɶ  and (8.4) 
 1t t ts sρ ε−= + ɶɶ ɶ .  
 By substituting Equation (8.4) into Equation (8.2) and combining the resulting 
equation with Equation (8.1), we are able to derive a forward-looking structural equation 
that determines the current value of tMɶ : 
 * * *1 1[ ] [ ]t t t t t t tM ME M M E M Msα α ω+ += − + +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  and (8.5) 
 *t tMω α ξ= − ɶ . (8.6) 
           To approximate the model, we iteratively r -linearize the model each period by 
substituting tN N=  into Equations (8.3) and (8.5). By using Equation (8.1), we are able 
to eliminate the interest rate from the system and re-write the debt accumulation 
equation: 
 1 1 * 11 1( [ ] / )t t t t t t t tN M N s N E M M M Mβ β ω α
− − −
+ += − + + − − +ɶ ɶ ɶɶ .  
 This approach allows us to evaluate two significant effects of the model’s non-
linearities. First, the debt accumulation equation n w considers fluctuations in the interest 
rate. Second, the weights given to each expectation in Equation (8.5) differ from those in 
Equation (4.3). We use the techniques of Section 3 to evaluate the model under rational 
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expectations. We obtain a side constraint that ensur s that the model’s transversality 
condition is not violated and a resulting equation f r the evolution of debt: 
 1 1 2 1( 1) (1 )( 1)( 1) ( , )t t t t t t t tM N s N s f Nβ β ρ β βρ βω α β ω
− − −= − + + − − − + +ɶ  and (8.7) 
 1 2 11 (1 ) [1 (1 )( 1)( 1) ] ( , )t t t t t t tN N N s h Nρ β ρ β βρ βω α β ω
− −
+ = + − − − − − − +ɶ .  
 Although this model is non-linear, its non-linearities are limited to pre-determined 
or exogenous variables and it is therefore easy to imulate.  Under rational expectations, 
debt continues to follow a random walk without drift. The current account ( 1t tN N+ − ), 
however, is no longer white noise but instead depends both on the products of debt and 
productivity and of debt and preference shocks. The current account is therefore both 
serially correlated and heteroskedastic.  
 We now analyze the iteratively re-linearized model under adaptive learning. We 
assume that Home agents use the following perceived law of motion (PLM): 
 t t t tM aN bN s= +ɶ ɶ .  
 The coefficient on lagged debt in Equation (8.7) is unchanged from Section 3. It is 
therefore unsurprising that simulations confirm that our iterative re-linearization does not 
affect the model’s behavior under adaptive learning. Although debt follows a random 
walk under rational expectations, the types of learning from Sections 4 and 6 continue to 
cause debt to behave explosively. Under the type of l arning from Section 7 with a 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1































































Average Time Until Crisis, d(γ ,γ*), for Different Gains 
(St. Error)
γ*
0.01 0.02 0.03
0.01
6467
(112.8)
6257
(106.0)
6585
(114.4)
γ 0.02
6358
(110.3)
4789
(94.7)
4705
(91.9)
0.03
6538
(113.3)
4653
(90.6)
3961
(84.4)
 
 
 
